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Tropes and Other Things
Cynthia Macdonald
Our day-to-day experience of the world regularly brings us into contact with middle-
sized objects such as apples, dogs, and other human beings.  These objects possess observable
properties, properties that are available or accessible to the unaided senses, such as redness and
roundness, as well as properties that are not so available, such as chemical ones.  Both of these
kinds of properties serve as valuable sources of information about our familiar middle-sized
objects at least to the extent that they enable us to understand the behaviours of those objects
and their effects on each other and on us.  I see the apple on the table before me, and in doing so
I see its redness, its roundness, and so on.  I do not see, but know that it has, a certain chemical
constitution.   The knowledge gained of the apple by  means  of  both  properties tells me
something about the nature of that apple.  In general, most, if not all, of the properties that
objects in the observable world possess serve as the basis of our knowledge of such objects.
But the subject-predicate form of much of our discourse and thought about objects suggests
that substances are one kind of thing, properties another.  We use subject terms such as names
to identify objects, predicate terms to attribute properties to them.  What, then, is it for an object
to have a property?  And what is the relation between an object and its properties?
These two questions and their treatment have a  long  and  respected tradition in
philosophy.  In what follows, I shall briefly outline some classic answers to them and the
difficulties associated with those answers, in order to provide a basis upon which to discuss the
view that, at root, reality consists of individual, particularized qualities known as tropes.  This
view, and the theory that grounds it, has been thought by many philosophers over the centuries
to offer an important and ultimately more satisfactory answer to the two questions just posed
than the other classic positions that I shall describe.  I want to see what the prospects for trope2
theory are.  So I need to explain what exactly trope theory is, and how it differs from these other
classic positions.
1.         Some Classic Views of Properties and Their Relation to Substances
Consider the first question raised above: what is it for an object to have a property?  This
question introduces a controversy between those who believe that all that exists in the world is
particular in being wholly and completely in only one place at any given time and concrete in
excluding other things of the same kind being in the same place at the same time, and those who
believe that, in addition to individual, concrete particular things, there are  properties, or
universals.  The former are known as nominalists, whereas the latter are known as realists.1
Universals are things that can be wholly and completely in many places at the same time, and so
are universal rather than particular, and are such that many of them can be in the same place at
the same time, and so are abstract.  
Suppose that there are two pens on my desk.  They are both red.  We can describe the
agreement in colour of the two pens in either of the following two ways.  We might say that the
first red pen is exactly like second red pen in colour.  Or we might say that the first red pen has
or shares the same colour as the second red pen.  The first way of describing the situation
suggests that two red pens, and a relation between them of likeness or resemblance, enter into it.
This is the way a certain kind of nominalist whom we may call a moderate nominalist would
                                                
1 Strictly speaking, nominalists may recognize the existence of properties, where these are viewed as classes or
sets of concrete particulars.  However these classes will themselves typically be viewed as constructions on
individual concrete particular things, not as irreducible kinds of things that exist in the world alongside
particular concrete things.  So, for example, Campbell says,
Some writers use the label `nominalist' for every denial of universals, but this blurs a crucial
distinction: ordinary nominalisms, in denying universals, deny the existence of properties,
except perhaps as shadows of predicates of classifications.   They recognize only  concrete
particulars and sets... (1990, p. 27)
Trope theory is thus depicted as an alternative to both realism and nominalism: an alternative to  the former
because it denies the in existence of universals as entities of an irreducible ontological category distinct from
concrete particulars, and an alternative to the latter because it affirms the existence of properties as individual,
particular things.  For more on realism and nominalism, see George Bealer (this volume), and the papers in that
section.3
prefer to describe the situation.2  A realist, however, would prefer to describe the situation, not as
one of colour resemblance, but as one of colour identity.  According to the realist, there are in
our imagined situation three things: two pens, and one universal, redness, which is instantiated
wholly and completely in each.
The motivations for each of these positions are numerous and complex.3  For example,
one important motivation for realism is semantic.  Realists point to the phenomenon of abstract
reference, i.e., apparent reference to abstract entities such as wisdom and beauty, and  the
generality involved in predication (and in thought), in support of their position.  Predicates such
as `is red' and their associated concepts are general in that they are applicable to an indefinite
number of particular things.  This evident advantage of realism is offset by an advantage in
epistemic motivation for nominalism.  Nominalists point to the apparent inaccessibility of
abstract objects such as universals - objects whose identities are not exhausted by, or perhaps
even relevantly connected to, any place in which they may be instantiated in the experienceable
world at any given time - to human experience.  This presents a problem for those who wish to
account for knowledge of universals on a view that grounds knowledge in sensory experience,
or on a view that requires causal interaction between knower and known.
Matters are yet more complicated, since there are explanatory motivations for both
positions.  Some realists maintain that universals and other abstract objects such as numbers are
indispensable to other disciplines, such as science (Putnam (this volume), Sober (1981, 1993).
This seems to be an explanatory motivation for realism.  However, nominalists deny that such
abstract objects are in fact indispensable, arguing that science can do without them.  Realists
have also claimed that such objects are required to explain the generality in thought and
language, and for the `objectivity' of  our judgements -  the idea that since our judgements
succeed in expressing something objectively true or false about the world, there must  be
something in the world that answers to them.   Nominalists have typically denied this, or
                                                
2 I say `moderate' here because such a nominalist is prepared to say that there is a an objective basis in reality
for the application of the same predicate, such as `red', to a number of particular things, namely, particular
resemblances that hold between them.  This contrasts with the more extreme view, which Armstrong (1978)
calls `predicate nominalism', that things that are called by the same name have nothing more in common than
that they are called by the same name.
3 For more on motivations for realism and nominalism, see George Bealer (this volume), and Michael Loux
(1978).4
maintained that although these objects are required for such explanatory purposes, they need not
be construed realistically but simply as classes constructed on concrete particular things.4
Against both realism and nominalism it could reasonably be said that neither has the
explanatory advantage over the other.   On the one hand, nominalism seems  incapable of
explaining the generality in thought and language.  On the other hand, realism's attempt to do so
by the postulation of universals seems also to fail.  Apparently, neither realism nor nominalism
gives an entirely satisfactory and unproblematic answer to the question of what it is for an object
to have a property.  On the contrary; both positions seem to be plagued with difficulties.
Turn now to the second question raised earlier: what is the relation between an object
and its properties?  This question and its treatment also have a long and venerable tradition in
philosophy.  Two theories that attempt to provide an answer are particularly well-known.  These
are the substratum theory and the bundle theory.5  According to the former, an individual object,
or substance, is the bearer of the properties with which it is associated, but is in itself bare, or
propertyless.  It is simply that which grounds, or supports, or unifies, the properties associated
with an individual substance; and it is what individuates, or distinguishes, each substance from
every other substance, even those whose properties are indiscernible from it.  It is, in other
words, a bare individuator.  According to the latter theory, an individual object or substance is
nothing `over and above' the properties with which it is associated.  A substance is a bundle, or
`congregation' of properties, and nothing more.6
Like realism and nominalism, the bare substratum theory and the bundle theory are each
motivated by a variety of considerations.  Each has its epistemic advantages.  On the one hand,
we think that what we encounter when we encounter individual objects in experience are not bare
individuators but the properties of a substance.  This suggests a view of substances as mere
                                                
4 Thus, Campbell tells us,
To have a property reduces to  belonging to  appropriate classes of glorying in  appropriate
descriptions.  To be a property is to be an open class of concrete particulars. (1990, p. 17)
Resemblance Nominalism...takes likenesses and differences among objects as primitive and
attempts to construct a theory of properties on that basis. (1990, p. 18)
5 For more on the bare substratum theory and the bundle theory, see Michael Loux (this volume), and Loux
(1978).
6 My use of `property' here is intended to be neutral on whether properties are taken to be universals or
particulars.5
bundles of properties.  On the other hand, we perceive substances as natural unities, which mere
bundles or aggregations of properties apparently are not.  This suggests that substances are
possessed of an element that grounds or unifies the properties with which they are associated,
and that it is this element that makes substances substances.  That is, it suggests that substances
are substrata, individuals that have, but are not identical with, their properties.
Both of these theories have professed to be able to serve a variety of  explanatory
purposes.  For example, the substratum theory has claimed to be better able than the bundle
theory to explain the phenomenon of change in individual substances - the fact that they survive
change while remaining the very same things, as well as the (modal) intuition that an object
could have been different than it in fact is.  If substances are identical with their properties, then
change, which involves the acquisition or  loss  of  a property by  a substance, seems to be
impossible.  For it entails that a substance could lose a constituent that gives it its identity.  But
it cannot do that without undergoing a change of identity, i.e., becoming something else
altogether.  So, if substances change, and survive change without losing their identities, the
bundle theory cannot explain how.  If, however, in addition to its properties, a substance has as a
constituent a bare individuator that is changeless, the problem of survival through change can be
explained.   Bare individuators are what survives through change.   In a similar vein, bare
individuators can be invoked to explain the intuition that an object could have been different than
it in fact is.  
The bundle theory, on the other hand, has professed to be better able than the bare
substratum theory to explain the nature of substance, since bare substrata have no natures.  The
bundle theory has also claimed an epistemic advantage over the substratum theory, since we
never meet with bare substrata as such in experience.   However, in response to  this  the
substratum theory has claimed to be able to accommodate our experience of substances as real
unities, which, it is said, the bundle theorist cannot accommodate.
As even this very incomplete and cursory survey indicates, both theories have their
attractions.  However, both suffer from serious problems.   Further, the weaknesses of  one
theory are not necessarily the strengths of the other.  Some problems, such as the problem of6
how to account for the phenomenon of survival through change, and the problem of how to
account for the unity that substances possess, plague both theories.
If one were to look no further or more deeply into the matter, one might be tempted to
think that realism and nominalism exhaust the possible ways of  attempting to answer the
question of what it is for a substance to have a property, and that the substratum theory and the
bundle theory exhaust the possible ways of attempting to answer the question of the relation
between an object and its properties.  However, in both of these cases there is a third possibility:
trope theory.7
Trope theory has been hailed as the answer to both of the questions raised earlier, and so
as the solution to the `problem' of universals and to the problem of the relation of particular
objects or substances to their properties.   It has therefore claimed to have an explanatory
advantage over traditional theories of what it is for a substance to have a property and traditional
theories of what the relation is between a substance and its properties.  It has also professed to
have an epistemic advantage over such theories.  Let us see whether this is so.
2.         What are Tropes?
Consider this particular sugar cube sitting on my saucer.  It has certain properties: it is
white, it has length, breadth, and depth, it has square surfaces, size, position, and so on.  When I
observe the cube, I observe its whiteness, its cuboid shape, its size, and its position on  the
saucer.  These properties are particular properties of the cube.  They are as particular as the cube
itself; they are not particular instances of a property that can also be instanced at the same or
distinct times in other places or objects.  Just as the cube cannot be in more than one place at
any given time - just as it is located all at once, wholly and completely, in the place it occupies at
                                                
7 The word `nominalism' has several meanings, as Simons (1993) points out.  As I am using the term, trope
theory is not nominalist.  Since it is not realist either, we need a name to cover all of the theories that are not
realist.  We might call these theories `particularist'.  Then nominalism and trope theory stand in contrast with
realism in being particularist.  However, as Simons has pointed out to me, what was called `nominalism' in the
middle ages (by William of Ockham, for example) included both substances and quality tropes.  According to
this use of the term, nominalism gets its name not from its view of what there is, but from its view of
universals, namely as names.  This second way of understanding nominalism would not construe trope theory
as an alternative to realism and nominalism, but rather, as a nominalist position.  I follow Campbell (1990) in
classifying the theories I discuss here in the former rather than in the latter way, reserving the term `nominalism'
for the view that properties either do not exist at all, or, if they do, are merely classes or sets of particulars.7
any given time - so too its whiteness, its size, and its shape cannot be in more than one place at
any given time.  For what I observe when I observe its whiteness is this particular whiteness of
the cube, not an instance of whiteness in general.  Similarly for the other observable properties
of this particular cube.
Particular properties that individual objects possess, such as this whiteness of this sugar
cube, are known as tropes.  Tropes have been called by many names: one common one is
`abstract particular'.  Others are `particularized quality', `concretized property', and `individual
accident'.
Keith Campbell tells us that resistance to the idea of a trope is based on a conflation of
one pair of terms or concepts, that of universal and particular, with another, that of abstract and
concrete.  This conflation is responsible for the belief that since to be universal just is to be
abstract, to be particular just is to be concrete.  On this basis, the possibility that there should
exist things that are both abstract and particular is ruled out.
However, what is universal is so because it is possible for it to be wholly and completely
in more than one spatial position at any given time. In contrast, what is particular can only be
wholly and completely in one spatial position at a given time.  And this, Campbell tells us, is
different from the contrast between abstract and concrete.  What is abstract is "what is  got
before the mind by an act of abstraction" (Campbell, this volume, p. 478).  It is what comes to
be known by attending to some part, or aspect, of "what is presented".  In contrast, what is
concrete is grasped by attending to all of what is presented, not by attending to some part or
aspect of it.  No special act of selective attending is involved in our grasp of concrete things.
According to Campbell, ordinary substances are concrete, since they are not got before
the mind by an act of abstraction.  We do not need to attend to part of what is presented to me to
grasp a shoe, or a sugar cube.  But we do need to do this to grasp a trope of a sugar cube.  So a
trope of a sugar cube is abstract.8
By this way  of  reckoning, something can  be  both  particular and  so  wholly and
completely in the spatial position it is in at any given time, and abstract.   This is  because
                                                
8 This raises a puzzle: mustn't I abstract the shoe from its surroundings?  And if so, does this make shoes
abstract?8
although it comes to be known by a process of  abstraction, what is  known is  wholly and
completely in the spatial position it is in at any given time.  Tropes are these things.
As the contrast between the names `abstract particular' and `concretized property' may
suggest, however, there is some disagreement about exactly how to understand what a trope is.
Campbell's sense of `abstract' is not the only one by which we understand something to be an
abstract particular, as Simons (this volume) points out.  There is another, well understood use of
that term to mean `non-spatiotemporal'.9  On this understanding, universals are abstract not
because they are got before the mind by an act of abstraction, but simply because although they
have instances in the spatiotemporal world, they are other than those instances.  In other words,
universals are thought to be outside space-time and are thought, for this reason, to be necessary
beings.   If  they were not necessary beings, they could come into existence or  go  out of
existence.  But to do that would require there to be a time before which they did not exist and
after which they did exist, or a time before which they existed and after which they did not.
Simons correctly points out that universals and other abstract things such as numbers
and sets, are thought by  many  to  be  abstract in  this  second  sense.    But  then, on  this
understanding of `abstract', tropes turn out not to be abstract particulars, but concrete particulars
(more specifically, concretized properties, in contrast with abstract particulars).  However, this
may not matter to the explanatory and other work that tropes can do.10  
Although the history of trope theory may not be as widely or as well recognized as that
of other theories of the ontology of properties, it is firmly entrenched.  It is thought that versions
of trope theory were held by philosophers such as Aristotle, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and
Husserl (Mertz, 1996).  More recently, versions have been held by Stout (1971), Strawson
(1959), Honderich (1988), Armstrong (1989), Heil (1992), Simons (this volume), and Campbell
(1990, this volume), whose recent work is a revival of the earlier foundational work of D.C.
                                                
9 Another sense of `abstract' is `less than fully determinate'.  This reading is suggested by Locke (1975), Book
Three.
10 On the contrary, as Simons (this volume) notes, it would defuse one objection to the classic view that
individual substances, i.e., concrete particulars, are constituted by tropes. The objection is that tropes are too
insubstantial, too abstract, to make up anything concrete.  One doesn't arrive at concreteness by bundling
together things that are not concrete.  If, however, tropes are concrete, then this objection to trope theory lapses.9
Williams (1953).  Williams set forth a version of trope theory that is now regarded as  the
classic account (Bacon, 1997).
According to this account, tropes are the foundations of  all  things,  and  so  the
foundations of both individual objects and properties or universals.  Individuals are bundles of
compresent or concurrent tropes; tropes that are, so to speak, `bundled' together by relations of
compresence.  For example, this whiteness, this cuboid shape, this size, this texture, and this
position (amongst other tropes), related to one another by compresence relations, together
`constitute' or comprise this sugar cube.  On the other hand, properties or universals are classes
of exactly similar or resembling tropes.11  Redness, for example, is the class of exactly similar
rednesses.  Let us look at these two aspects of the account in turn.
The classic trope view of individual substances typically construes the relation between
the tropes that constitute a substance and the substance itself to be either a part-whole (or
mereological) relation (Williams, Campbell), or some other kind of relation that is  not
mereological, such as a set-theoretic (Bacon) or a foundational (Simons) one.12  The ultimate
constituents of substances are themselves primitive tropes, tropes that are too simple to be
further analyzed, or broken down into parts.  An example of a primitive trope is this whiteness
of this sugar cube.  It may appear that this trope can be further broken down, or analyzed into a
part that is a `thisness' and a part that is a `whiteness'.  But classically, trope theorists deny that
this is possible.  To suppose that it is belies a tendency to think of a property instance in realist
terms, as an instance of a repeatable, universal entity, where it is a contingent matter whether the
instance is an instance of this (or indeed, any) specific property.  However, this whiteness is
essentially this-whiteness, not essentially a thisness and essentially a whiteness, and so is a
                                                
11 This conception of properties is problematic.  When a new red thing (and so a new red trope) comes into
existence, the class of red tropes changes (strictly speaking, a new class comes into existence, since classes - on
the extensional view - cannot change their members).  However, redness neither changes, nor does it go out of
existence, to be replaced by a new property.  So it looks as though there are truths about properties that are not
truths about classes of tropes.
12 The foundation relation relates ways in which things are rather than what they are, so relates the wrong sorts
of things to be related in a mereological, or part-whole way. Set-theoretic relations are not mereological because
set membership is transitive, whereas being part of a collection is not.  Bacon (1995) claims that set-theoretic
relations are not mereological because a set can change its actual members and still remain the same set, unlike
the relation between a whole and its parts.  Bacon is here treating sets intensionally rather than extensionally.
On the extensional reading, a set cannot change its members and remain the same, since its identity is
determined by its actual members.  Presumably Bacon prefers the intensional reading since it allows him to
reconcile his view that individuals are classes of tropes with the view that individuals can change with respect
to their properties while remaining the same individuals.10
simple unit that cannot be further decomposed.  Simple or primitive tropes are the foundations
of all the individuals that exist.   
One way of describing the relation between primitive tropes and the substances that they
comprise is to say that individual substances are bundles of tropes.   But this way of describing
things would not by itself distinguish individual substances from universals, or properties, and
relations. According to the classic theory, these latter are also bundles of tropes in some sense
or other.  What, then, distinguishes the bundles that are individual substances from the bundles
that are universals (etc.)?
According to the classic theory, universals, or properties, and relations, are bundles (or
classes or sets (Bacon)) of exactly similar or resembling tropes.  Individual tropes (e.g., all the
rednesses of all the red things) that comprise the bundle (or are members of the set) of exactly
resembling tropes with which a given property is identical are then understood to be instances of
that property.  For a substance to have, or instantiate a property (universal, relation) is for one of
its tropes to exactly resemble all of the tropes that comprise that property (or for the set of
tropes that is the individual substance to overlap the set of tropes that is the property).13
Given individual substances and properties or universals, trope theory is  capable of
handling compound universals and entities such as states of affairs, construed as complexes of
individual substances, properties, and relations.  The foundations of all things, then, are tropes
and two fundamental relations: compresence and resemblance.  Further relations may be needed
at higher levels of trope complexity in order to handle compound universals, states of affairs,
and so on, however, and a question arises as to whether treating all relations as tropes leads to an
infinite regress.  We discuss this problem further in section 3 (ii) below.
                                                
13 However, there is a problem here.  Bacon (1997) acknowledges that on this conception of individuals and
properties, the way that individuals relate to properties is symmetric: instantiation is just overlapping between
classes of tropes that are compresent with one another and classes of tropes that resemble one another.  The
result is that we can just as easily say that the property instantiates the individual as that the individual
instantiates the property.  Bacon rules this possibility out, but gives no principled reason.  The problem here is
not that there is no distinction between individuals, but that the relation between them, which we think to be
asymmetric, turns out to be symmetric.11
3.         The Prospects for Trope Theory
As stated earlier, trope theory is thought to have a number of advantages over traditional
theories of what properties are and how they relate to substances.   One such advantage is
epistemic (Bacon, Campbell).  Another is explanatory (Bacon, Campbell, Simons).   Let us
consider these in turn.
(i)         Trope Theory is Preferable to other Alternatives for Epistemic Reasons.
A number of recent advocates of trope theory have recorded this as an advantage for the
theory, notably Bacon.  As he sees it,
While tropism, like any other theory, must stand or fall on its merits, it may be
asking too much to expect metaphysical arguments to establish its pre-eminence.
The substance-attribute view, the  property-bundle theory, the  trope-bundle
theory, and even perhaps model-theoretic particularism are apparently all capable
of modeling each other (Bacon 1988).   If  tropes deserve first place in first
philosophy, it may be for epistemological or even pragmatic reasons.  As we
knock about the world, it is  tropes we encounter in the first instance.   An
intelligible theory can start there. (Bacon, 1997)
However, there are problems with this view.  One problem concerns the grounds for
epistemological priority of tropes to  other  categories of  things.    Another concerns what
ontological conclusions are warranted, supposing those grounds to be compelling.
Bacon thinks that tropes are the first things with which we  come into  contact in
experience of the world.  However, not all trope theorists seem to be as unequivocal as Bacon is
on this point.  Campbell, for instance, believes that tropes are typically known by an act of
abstraction "from what is presented".  This suggests that tropes are not epistemologically prior
to the substances  that they  comprise.   On  the  contrary, it  suggests  that substances are
epistemologically prior to tropes.12
It is true that Campbell thinks that tropes could exist independently of one another even
if they in fact do not.14  This might be seen as constituting a ground for thinking that they are
epistemologically prior in the sense that, although they are not typically known independently of
knowing the substances that they comprise, they are knowable independently of knowledge of
such substances.  However, this line of defence is problematic for two reasons.
First, not all trope theorists think it plausible, or desirable, to view tropes as capable of
independent existence in this way.   Simons (this volume), for example, expressly commits
himself to the dependency of at least some tropes on others, and on the substances that they
comprise.  He acknowledges primitive `internal' relations, resemblances being among these, and
primitive compresence or concurrence relations, between tropes.  He further posits primitive
foundation relations, which are intended to serve as the `glue' that unifies tropes into substances.
Tropes, then, are dependent entities both in that they bear primitive internal relations to one
another and in that they bear primitive internal relations to the substances that they found.   As
Simons explains,
...the relation of foundational relatedness is defined in terms of dependence or
foundation.   The  definition  of  a  foundational system  requires  that  the
dependence needs of each member of the collection is met within the collection,
and further requires that the whole system be fully connected. (Simons, this
volume, p. 562)
Simons develops this view on behalf of trope theory in order to handle one of its principal
difficulties, namely, that whereas substances seem to be real unities, bundles of tropes do not.
Because Simons sees tropes as being, not parts of the individuals they comprise, but ways in
which those individuals are, or `individualized ways', they cannot exist independently of  the
individual substances whose ways they are.   The internal foundation relation promises to
                                                
14 This suggests that it is not a necessary fact about them that they are known by a process of abstraction, but a
contingent one.  This raises a potential problem, since it suggests that tropes are contingently abstract, whereas
it seems to be a central commitment of trope theory that tropes are essentially, or by their very nature, abstract.13
provide what is needed to handle the distinction between mere bundles of tropes and substances,
but only by conceding the dependency of tropes on substances.
It is unlikely that Campbell's view can handle this difficulty with trope theory without
making such a concession.  One might try to generate those bundles of tropes that comprise
substances by appeal to internal relations between certain tropes.  But then the question arises,
which tropes?  It is doubtful that the relevant ones can be identified independently of appeal to
the fact that these are substance-involving.  One might think, for instance, that it is primary-
quality tropes, tropes such as this particular shape, and this size, whose compresence seems to
be both necessary and sufficient for the presence of a substance.  But the distinction between
primary quality-tropes and other quality-tropes itself appears to require appeal to the fact that
primary quality-tropes are those that are constitutive of substances.
It is difficult, then, to see how the view that tropes are epistemically prior to substances
can be substantiated via the claim that tropes  are  ontologically independent and  prior  to
substances, since this latter claim is itself questionable.   Just  as  substances cannot exist
(according to trope theory) without the tropes that found them, tropes seem incapable of existing
without the substances that they found.  And this existence dependence makes it difficult to see
how one can be epistemically prior to the other: when I see a substance, I do so by seeing its
tropes; but equally, when I see tropes, I see them as individualized ways of the substances they
found.  Similarly for changes, construed as replacements of tropes in substances, and the things
in which they are changes.
But there is a second reason why appealing to the ontological independence of tropes
from the things they constitute or found is unlikely to show that tropes are epistemically prior to
these things.  Even if it were true that tropes and substances are ontologically independent of
one another, and true that tropes are ontologically prior to substances, it would not follow
without further argument that tropes are epistemically prior to substances.  For the existence-
independence of one thing from another is compatible with knowledge of one being dependent
on knowledge of the other.  Think, for example of sub-atomic particles, and theoretical entities
generally.  It is plausible to hold that the causal relations they bear, or are apt to bear, to things
of other kinds they bear to them contingently.  If so, then they could exist independently of the14
things to which they bear such causal relations.  But it is hardly credible that they could be
known without knowing their effects on things of those other kinds.
This point leads directly to the second problem mentioned above, which concerns what
ontological conclusions, if  any,  would  be  warranted  if  it  were  true  that  tropes  are
epistemologically prior to  entities of  other  categories.   Suppose  that we  come to  know
substances by coming to know the ways that they are, to use Simons' terminology, rather like
the way we suppose ourselves to come to know objects in the observable world by  their
observational properties, such as their colours and shapes.   Still, no  ontological priority is
thereby established, for epistemological priority is compatible with existence-dependence.  A
substance's shape may be a trope of that substance, and it may be that I come to know that
substance by coming to know its shape.  But its shape, being a primary quality trope of it, may
nevertheless not be existence-independent of the substance of which it is a trope, since it is
plausible that primary qualities are themselves substance-involving.
(ii)        Trope Theory is Preferable to Other Alternatives for Explanatory Reasons.
There seem to be two main grounds for thinking that trope theory is  explanatorily
superior to other accounts of the nature of properties and how they relate to substances.  One
focuses on the ontological economy of trope theory.  The other focuses on the claim that trope
theory is capable of explaining more, or better, what other alternatives attempt to explain.  Let us
consider these in turn.
Campbell, Simons, and Bacon all see trope theory as having an advantage over other
alternatives in being a single-category ontology.  That is, they believe that trope theory is a
simpler theory than other alternatives, in using only one kind of thing to explain both what it is
for an object to have a property and what the relation is between a thing and its properties.
Bacon (1995), for example, claims that trope theory is preferable to others because it can do the
same metaphysical work as the others with fewer kinds of  things.   And Campbell (1990)
explicitly draws on Ockham's Razor in one of his arguments in  favour of  trope  theory.15
According to this, we should not accept more kinds of entities in a theory than is absolutely
necessary.15
But is it unnecessary to admit entities of basic kinds other than tropes? And can trope
theory do the same metaphysical work as other ontologies?  Campbell (1990) tells us that our
thinking about the nature of reality is governed by a methodological principle, which he calls the
Axiom of Uniformity.  This principle expresses the conviction that at root, reality is constituted
by elements of a single kind.  This principle, Campbell tells us, it is vindicated by trope theory.
However, Campbell acknowledges that the Axiom of Uniformity, even if true, is not a
necessary truth.   So the question that needs to be answered is not whether  trope  theory
vindicates the axiom, but whether trope theory, and the axiom it supports, are together vindicated
by the superior explanatory work that they do.  And that depends on the second question just
raised; whether trope theory, as a single-category ontology, can do the same metaphysical work
as other ontologies.  So let us consider the grounds for this.
What is required in order for trope theory to account for the nature of properties and
their relation to substances?  Trope theorists are agreed that more is required than primitive, or
basic tropes.  At the very least, relations such as resemblance (for properties) and compresence,
concurrence, or foundation (for substances) are required.  But how are relations to be handled
by the theory?
Trope theorists seem to be divided about this.   Bacon, for example, takes relations
between individual objects such as substances (ordinary relations such as being smaller than), as
well as ones between tropes, to be  as  real and  irreducible as  non-relational or  monadic
characteristics of tropes and substances that they  comprise.   Particular compresence and
similarity relations are to be treated, in the first instance, as second-level tropes, ones that bind or
bundle basic, or first-level tropes.  For example, second-level tropes are required in order to
group particular rednesses together, and similarly for greennesses, squarenesses, and so on.
                                                
15 Bacon (1997) seems to see ontological economy as either an epistemic advantage or pragmatic one, as the
quotation in the text indicates.  It may be that he sees appeal to tropes as appeal to the familiar, rather than the
unfamiliar, in our account of the nature of the world, which might be considered a pragmatic advantage, given
that tropes are epistemically prior in being what we encounter first in experience.  But this pragmatic advantage
presumes what has been found to be questionable in 2(i), namely that tropes are epistemically prior to things of
other kinds, such as substances.16
These similarity groupings are  the  basis  for  the  construction of  the  classes  with which
properties such as being green and being red are identified.  Further relations are then required
in order to bundle redness relations together with greenness relations as relations of colour, and
similarly for squareness and triangularity relations vis a vis relations of shape, and so on.  The
same kind of situation holds for compresence relations and substances.
One consequence of this is that since, for any level n, n+1 level relations are needed to
bundle tropes at that level into the required similarity or compresence relations, the account is
threatened with an infinite regress (Bacon (1997), Daly (1994).  This regress threatens because
trope theory seeks to account for the appearance of shared properties in terms of an analysis of
resemblances between distinct tropes (such as individual rednesses) that posits only tropes,
relational ones.  So the analysis of resemblances at each level requires positing relational tropes
at one level up, and there seems to be no end to this.  Bacon himself recognizes this, but blocks
the regress by taking 3rd or 4th level relations to be primitive, or brute.16
Campbell, following Williams, takes a different view of  relations.   He  holds  that
although trope theory requires compresence and resemblance relations in addition to primitive
or basic tropes, these relations supervene on the tropes they relate and so do not constitute an
addition of any real ontic significance:
`Supervenience' covers those cases where an unavoidable expansion in  our
descriptive resources does not rest on any expansion in our commitment to the
realities described. (Campbell, 1990, p. 100)17
It is unclear why Campbell thinks that the fact (if it is a fact) that relations between
tropes supervene on the inherent characteristics of the tropes involved in such relations shows
the relations themselves to be of no real ontic significance.   This  would only  be  so  if
                                                
16 For more on this, see Chris Daly (1994), who adapts Russell's (1911-2) argument against resemblance
nominalism to trope theory.
17 Supervenience is typically expressed as a relation between two properties or families of properties such that,
necessarily, objects that are the same with regard to the first (subvening) properties are the same with regard to
the second (supervening) properties.  (Alternatively: objects cannot differ with regard to the supervening without
differing with regard to the subvening properties.)  See Kim (1984). In this case, the relations of resemblance
and compresence are envisaged as supervening on the tropes they relate.17
supervenience is a reductive relation, which some think it is not (Macdonald 1989).  The fact
that it is a dependency relation no more shows that supervening properties reduce to properties
on which they supervene than the fact that changes are dependent on the things in which they
are changes shows that changes are reducible to the things that undergo them, or the fact that
individualized ways (tropes) of substances depend on substances shows that such ways are
reducible to the substances of which they are ways.
Evidently Campbell thinks this because he thinks relations can be `explained away' by
distinguishing between `inherent' and `adherent' (or monadic and relational) characteristics of
tropes. Inherent characteristics are ones  that tropes  have `in  their own  right'.   Adherent
characteristics, in contrast, are ones that tropes have in virtue of their relations to other tropes.
Campbell holds that the truth conditions of sentences ascribing adherent characteristics (such as
resemblances, or compresences, or causal characteristics) to n-tuples of tropes are held to be
exhaustively determined by ones ascribing inherent characteristics (such as particular colours, or
particular temperatures) to  the  individual tropes  comprising  those  n-tuples.    Inherent
characteristics of tropes seem not only to be essential to them, but also the basis of  what
Campbell and others (e.g., Simons) call internal (as opposed to external) relations between
them.  
Campbell thinks that the distinction between inherent and adherent characteristics is
important and useful to trope theory.   This is  because trope theory claims an explanatory
advantage over other theories such as realism and nominalism and the bare substratum and
bundle theories of substances with regard to infinite regress objections, and Campbell believes
that the distinction between inherent and adherent properties and between internal and external
relations can be employed to circumvent such objections.   However, the strategy can only
succeed if the distinction on which it is founded can be sustained.  And it is uncertain whether it
can be sustained.  Let me briefly explain.  
Campbell's appeal to the supervenience of relations on inherent properties of tropes is
intended to block a certain kind of infinite regress objection to trope theory; in fact, the very
regress objection just mentioned in connection with Bacon's view of relations.  The objection is
that tropes can only serve to explain the nature of properties and substances if there are relations18
(of compresence and resemblance, in the first instance) that hold between them.  But on trope
theory, these must also be tropes, if appeal to universals is to be avoided.  But then relations of
compresence need further relations to hold  between them, and  so  too  do  relations of
resemblance, to `bind' or bundle them into the relations they are, and so on.  At each stage of
trope bundling, higher-order relations will need to do the bundling work.  Such higher-order
relations will then themselves need to be bundled, which will require relations an order further
up still, and so on ad infinitum.
Campbell's strategy for blocking this objection is different from Bacon's.  It is to ground
all such relations in the inherent characteristics of primitive ground-level or primitive tropes,
whose resemblances can then be explained by appeal to internal relations that bind them by their
very natures.18  At this stage, resemblances are, as it were, brute, not further analyzable.
However, the distinction between inherent and adherent characteristics is problematic.  It
may seem easy to mark with respect to such characteristics as being next to, or being in front of
or being behind, on the one hand, and being in the Royal Northern College of Music or being in
the British museum, on the other, where the former clearly and explicitly require the presence of
at least two individuals, whereas the latter do not.  But the distinction is much less easy to mark
once one recognizes that, given that space, or space-time, is relative, positions themselves are
relative.  Thus it seems that the attribution of a position to a thing is implicitly, if not explicitly
relational.  Similarly for going faster than or going slower than and going at 55 m.p.h., since
movement too is relative.
If this is true for characteristics of ordinary objects, why should it not be true for
tropes?19  But a trope's position certainly seems to be an inherent, rather than an adherent,
characteristic of it.  So it seems that not all inherent characteristics of tropes are ones that they
have `in their own right'.  Rather, they are ones that they have in virtue of their relations to other
tropes (and so are adherent characteristics by Campbell's criterion).
                                                
18 Simons (this volume) exploits a similar strategy.  But cf. Bacon, who recognizes relational characteristics in
addition to monadic ones even for the primitive tropes, and who blocks the regress at level 4, by taking the
relations at that level to be brute, or primitive. See Bacon (1995).
19 In fact, it is arguable that irrespective of whether space-time is absolute or relative, a trope's position is a
relative matter.  If it is absolute, then a trope's position is determined by its relation to an absolute position in
space-time, and if it is relative, then its position is determined by its relation to another trope or tropes.19
Further, if a trope's position is not an inherent characteristic of it, then trope theory
seems to be no real advance on realism, the view that there are universals.  For a trope's time and
place of occurrence is then contingently related to it and is simply another trope to be related to
it by the relation of compresence.  But then in order to block infinite regresses of the sort that
threaten realism with respect to the instantiation or exemplification relation (see below), the
relation between a trope and its time and place of occurrence must, as the relation between a
universal and its instance must, be taken as primitive or brute.  Not only does this fail to be an
advance on realism, but it undermines the claim that individual tropes are particulars, by virtue of
the contingency of their relations to space-time.
In fact, Campbell (1990, p. 66) seems to favour the view that space-time regions or
points are `quasi-tropes' whose relations to primitive or basic tropes are contingent.  So the
compresence relations that `bind' them seem not to be internal but external ones (cf. Campbell,
1990, p. 131).  This makes particular tropes, such as this-whiteness-here-now, complex tropes,
even if the compresence relations that bind their constituents are brute or primitive.  It seems to
follow from this that there are no simple tropes, no  cases of  a single trope's existence or
occurrence.  It also seems to follow that not only internal relations, but certain external relations,
between basic tropes are brute or primitive.
   One consequence of this is to undermine the theory's claim to explanatory superiority.
Campbell prefers trope theory to realism on the grounds that realism has difficulties explaining
the relation between properties and their instantiations.  In his view, realism is forced to take that
relation (which he calls `inherence') as sui generis or primitive.  And he thinks that this is
objectionable (Campbell, 1990, p. 15), and that any two-category ontology will inevitably suffer
from such a problem.  But then, since trope theory evidently suffers from it too, the fact that
trope theory is a single-category ontology cannot by itself be an argument in its favour.  (For
more on this, see the discussion of realism below.)    
 The appeal to internal relations between tropes is  also problematic, irrespective of
whether this is grounded in appeal to inherent characteristics of such entities.  According to
trope theorists, primitive tropes are essentially characterized in terms  of  the  particularized
properties that they are.  In virtue of this, they are internally related to certain other tropes by20
their very natures.  So this redness is internally related to that redness, but not, it seems, to that
greenness.20
What then about causal relations between tropes?   Are tropes related in  this  way
internally related or not?  Campbell says not; but suppose that it is true that it is in the nature of
an event to be a cause or an effect.  Then events are essentially characterized in terms of their
causal roles, the causal relations that they are apt to bear to other events, and, on the classic
account, some species of tropes (those that are events) are internally related to others causally.
So it seems that some internally related tropes are not so related in virtue of characteristics that
they have `in their own right'.
And what about spatial relations, since tropes are essentially characterized by where and
when they are?  If one were to keep parity with the suggestion that it is essential characteristics
that determine internal relations, one would favour the view that these relations are internal, just
as the relations between particular rednesses are.  But positional characteristics are not ones that
tropes have independently of one another, if space-time is relative.
Evidently, just as it is hard to say whether certain characteristics of ordinary objects,
such as solubility or malleability, require that they bear internal relations to other things, it is
hard to say whether certain characteristics of tropes, such as their positions, require that they
bear internal relations to other things.  Are sons internally related to their fathers?  Certainly
being a son is not a property that a thing can have, `taken by itself'.  But nothing can be a son
without being related to a father.  Further, having the father one has may be an essential property
of a biological organism such as a human being, irrespective of whether it is described as a son.
Suppose, contrary to what has just been argued, that trope theory is able to explain the
nature of properties and their relations to substances by  appeal to the distinction between
inherent and adherent characteristics or internal and external relations without falling prey to
infinite regress objections.  Still, it is not clear that the theory has any explanatory advantage
                                                
20 It may look as though tropes are internally related only to those tropes that either belong to the same
property, or belong to logically related properties.  But trope theorists such as Simons (this volume) deny this.
His foundation relations, which are internal relations, relate tropes belonging to properties that are not logically
related, such as redness (the species) and shape (the genus).  Redness (the species) and squareness (the species)
are not foundationally related, since there might be nothing that is both red and square, but only many red
things and many square things.  But redness, the species, is foundationally related to shape, the genus, since
red things must have some shape or other.21
over realism and nominalism or over the bare substratum and bundle theories of substances with
regard to such objections, since it may be that these other theories are also capable of explaining
the nature of properties and their relations to substances without falling prey to such objections.
We have seen that trope theory claims an advantage over traditional nominalism in being capable
of explaining how resemblance relations are grounded in a way that avoids infinite resemblance
regresses.  Similarly, it claims an advantage over realism in being capable of explaining what
things that resemble one another with regard to a particular property such as redness have in
common without generating infinite regresses.  But are these claims true?
Consider nominalism.  It is said to be inferior because it must rely on
resemblances between particular substances in order to account for the generality in thought and
language, for why different objects are all called red, or why they fall under the same concept,
the concept, red.   Since nominalism does not recognize either properties (at  least not  as
primitive, or basic entities) or tropes, it must rely on  relations of  resemblance that are not
respect-specific (as, for example, resemblance with respect to  redness  is)  to  generate the
distinctions required to explain such generality.  This leads to difficulties in cases where the
same items resemble one another in more than one way (as, for example, red, triangular things
do), where one wants to but evidently cannot distinguish the redness resemblances from the
triangularity ones without presupposing the respects with which they resemble one another and
so presuming the very taxonomies of concepts or predicates that nominalism is obligated to
explain.  It also leads to difficulties in cases where a group of items each resemble one another
in at least one way, but where none of the items resembles all of the others in one single way (so
there is no common element in the group at all), as when one red square thing resembles a red,
triangular thing, which in turn resembles a triangular blue thing.  Trope theory appears to have
the advantage over nominalism here in that its primitive elements are already respect-specific
with regard to the properties of which they are tropes.  So resemblance relations between them
are grounded in their very natures.
But this appearance of explanatory advantage is misleading.  The problem that plagues
nominalism concerns, not how to explain why things resemble one another, but  how to explain
why it is not the case that everything resembles everything else.  That is, its real problem is to22
explain why it is that, say, the resemblances that bind green things do not include red things; that
green-making resemblances are not the same as square-making ones, and so on.  Trope theory
gives the appearance of explaining such taxonomic differences by reference to particularized
properties.  However, the theory cannot help itself to property-distinctions to make good these
differences.  So how does the theory manage to distinguish the individual rednesses that make
for  redness  resemblances  from  the  individual  greennesses  that  make  for  greenness
resemblances, or the individual squarenesses that make for squareness resemblances?  To this
the answer evidently is: their natures.  And what is it about their natures that explains such
resemblances?  This, it is said, is primitive, brute.
But recourse to bruteness is not the sole prerogative of the trope theorist.  A nominalist
is also entitled to this move (and so, for that matter is a realist).  What is it in virtue of which
individual red things are red things?  They are all red.  What is it for them to be red?  This is
brute, not further analyzable.  If it is legitimate for a trope theorist to employ this way of
blocking further demands for explanation, it is equally legitimate for a nominalist to do so.
As far as explanatory power goes, then, trope theory and nominalism seem to be on an
equal footing: both need resemblances.  In the case of trope theory, internal relations and appeal
to particularized properties promises to provide more substantial  theoretical backing  -
ontological glue, so to speak - for resemblance.  But that promise comes to no more than the
promise offered by a moderate nominalist.
What about realism?  Here again, trope theory claims to have the explanatory edge; but
again it seems to come to no more than what the realist can offer.  Realism too is under an
obligation to explain the similarities between distinct particulars.   It  does  so  by  positing
universals, multiply instantiatable entities that are invoked to  explain what unifies distinct
particular things that fall under the same predicate or concept.  The claim is that such things do
so because each of them instantiates one and the same universal.  So, according to the realist, red
things resemble one another with respect to redness because each of them instantiates one and
the same universal, redness.
A familiar objection to this attempt to explain how appeal to universals explains what
collects distinct but resembling particulars is that such an appeal will only work if universals are23
related to their instances.  However, the objection continues, such relations can only `bind' a
universal to its instances if there are further relations that `bind' the initial relations to the
universals, on the one hand, and to their instances, on the other hand; and this leads to an infinite
regress.
However, the realist can block the threat of regress as effectively as the trope theorist
can, by insisting that the ground-level relations that hold between universal and instance -
instantiation or exemplification -are sui generis or primitive.  It is true that the relation between
universal and instance is contingent in that each instance of a given universal might have failed
to exist or occur.  But not much follows from this.  In particular, it does not follow that any
instance of a universal that in fact occurs might have occurred without being an instance of the
universal it in fact is an instance of.  It may be that at least some instances of universals are such
that it is of the essence of those instances that they be instances of the universals they are
(perhaps  God's  instantiation  of benevolence  is one such).    In  general,  it  is  unclear  why
realism cannot avail itself of  the view that some instances are essentially instances of  the
universals they are instances of or why, consequently, it cannot avail itself of the view that the
relation between universal and instance, in at least some cases, is `internal', grounded in the
natures of the two things.  Insofar as it can, it seems as capable as trope theory is of doing its
explanatory work without falling prey to infinite regress objections, despite the fact that it
employs entities of more than one kind to do that work.
3.         Conclusion
Trope theory has been thought to have a number of  epistemic and  explanatory
advantages over other alternative views on basic ontology, and it is  both an interesting and
important view.  However, the discussion in the preceding section suggests that at least some of
these claims are unfounded.  The principal one on which this piece has concentrated is that trope
theory has an advantage over both realism and nominalism with regard to explaining what it is
for a thing to have a property.  I have argued that this advantage is only apparent.  It is true that
realism posits more kinds of entities to do the explanatory work that it does than does either24
trope theory or nominalism.  This is also true for moderate nominalism, since that theory works
with particular objects such  as  substances  and  relations, and  trope  theory  works  with
particularized properties (of which relations are a species) out of which it constructs substances
and properties.21   However, while I think that trope theory is important, and worth continued
careful attention, I feel that the balance still favours a realist view.  I would like to close with
some words on why that is.
Simons, in discussing tropes, tells us that they are best viewed as particularized ways in
which things can be, and that the relation between them and the things that they comprise is
better viewed as a relation of realization rather than as a mereological (or part-whole) relation.  I
think that Simons is right about how best to view the relation between things such as substances
and their properties.   And trope theory, as a single-category ontology, seems to  have an
ontological advantage over realism in the number of kinds of basic entities it uses to do its
explanatory work.  Earlier I mentioned that Ockham's Razor is  considered by  some trope
theorists, such as Campbell, to advantage trope theory over others.  However, Ockham's Razor
only applies to unnecessary posits.  I think that universals may be necessary to provide a natural
and economical account, at  a  much  more  sophisticated level, of  how  properties that are
themselves related to one another in complex but non-logical or non-conceptual ways, as do
certain supervenient to subvenient properties (such as, perhaps, moral properties to natural ones,
or mental properties to physical ones) jointly relate to the things that have them.
Realism does not seem to have any special advantage over trope theory with regard to
properties that are logically or conceptually related, such as redness and colouredness.  Both
theories are capable of  claiming that such properties are either jointly realized in a single
                                                
21 I think it likely that trope theory's professed explanatory advantage over the bare substratum and bundle
theories in accounting for the relation between a substance and its properties is also more apparent than real, but
I cannot develop the argument for that conclusion here.  I can however give a brief indication of how the
argument might be developed specifically with respect to the bundle theory.  The question whether trope theory
has the explanatory advantage over this theory depends in part on how the trope theorist is to account for the
unity of substances.  Trope theory uses relations of compresence to bundle together the tropes that are
constitutive of substance.  But compresence is typically taken to be an external rather than an internal relation.
Given that it is, trope theory seems to have as much difficulty accounting for the unity of substances as does
the bundle theory, which suffers from the objection that according to it, substances are `mere collocations' of
properties.  Either trope theory, along with the bundle theory, can appeal to extrinsic relations (which for trope
theory are further tropes, and for the bundle theorist are further properties), in which case a kind of infinite
regress problem threatens: further relations are then needed to `glue' the original relations to one another, and so
on ad infinitum.  Or the relations that are taken to bind the properties of the bundle together can be taken to be
primitive or brute, not further analyzable.25
instance (realism) or that the tropes comprising the one property (redness) are identical with the
tropes comprising the other (colouredness), thereby effecting economy at the level of instances
or particularized properties.  This economy can help to explain why property hierarchies that are
infinite, as is, for example, the hierarchy of properties that begins with being 20 metres long,
being less than 21 metres long, being less than 30 metres long, etc. are not a real worry from an
ontological point of view.   This is because it can help to dispel worries  about  causal
overdetermination, where this is a matter, not of properties, but of their instancings.  Instancing
the property of being 20 metres long just is instancing the properties of being less than 21
metres long, being less than 30 metres long, and so on.  So, by the extensionality of the causal
relation, if the instancing of the property of being 20 metres long is causally efficacious, so is
the instancing of the other properties.  A similar point holds for tropes.
However, trope theory is not as easily able to handle relations between particular things
and their properties when these properties are not logically or  conceptually related to one
another, but nevertheless bear interesting relations such as supervenience to one another.  It is,
for example, less well suited to provide the underlying metaphysic for such sophisticated
positions in the philosophy of mind as nonreductive monism.  Let me explain.
Nonreductive monism is the view that each mental event is a physical event although
mental properties are neither reducible to nor correlated in a (causal or other) lawlike way to
physical ones.  The feat this theory seems to accomplish is to reconcile monism at the level of
particular events and their causal transactions, with the sui generis distinctness of the mental and
physical at the level of properties.   However, trope  theory has  difficulties providing the
underlying metaphysics for such a view (Macdonald and Macdonald, 1991).  This is because
whatever way it construes the monism claim, it runs up against one or another of the central
commitments of nonreductive monism.
On the classic account, where tropes are taken to be the constituents of everything that
there is, trope theory takes events to be tropes, or complexes of tropes (Campbell, this volume,
1990).  It also takes tropes to be the items that figure in causal laws.  How then are we to
understand the claim that each mental event is a physical event?   Suppose that mental/physical
tropes  are  not  complex,  so  that  we  take  it  to  mean  that  this  pain-trope  just  is  this26
neurophysiological event-trope.  Then the distinction between mental and physical properties
seems unsustainable, with the consequence that non-reductive monism is reductive.22   For
properties are classes  of  exactly resembling tropes, and  physical tropes  that are  exactly
resembling will thereby be mental tropes that are exactly resembling.  Since the mental/physical
tropes are not complex, and so not further analyzable, there will be no means by  which to
distinguish mental properties from physical properties.
Suppose, on the other hand, that mental/physical tropes are complex. Then a different
problem arises for non-reductive monism.  That view presumes that mental events causally
interact with physical events; that mental events are  causes.    It  also  requires that causal
interactions be governed by causal laws.  But according to trope theory, it is tropes that are
causes and tropes that figure in causal laws.   If, in order for mental events to be causes, mental
events must be governed by causal laws, and if for that to be so according to trope theory is for
the mental tropes of the complexes that are mental/physical events to figure in laws, then non-
reductive monism cannot be sustained by trope theory.  For it follows from this that either
mental events/tropes are not causes, which contradicts one central commitment of nonreductive
monism, or that mental events/tropes figure in causal laws, which contradicts a different but
equally central commitment of that view.
Realism neatly solves all of this, since it easily allows for a single instance to be an
instance of properties that are non-logically or non-conceptually connected.  Mental properties
and physical properties that bear non-logical but complex relations to one another can thus be
seen to be related to the events that are instances of them in a way that allows those instances to
be viewed as non-complex compatibly with the sui generis distinctness of  the  properties
instanced.  For realism allows us to say that a given instance is essentially an instance of one
property but nonessentially, or contingently, an instance of another.   This gives realism an
advantage over trope theory.  For, on that view, non-complex tropes, being simple and not
                                                
22 We could, as Bacon (1995, 1997) suggests, be Meinongians about tropes, maintaining that there can be non-
existent or non-actual tropes as well as actual ones, and then argue that mental properties can be distinguished
from physical ones because in other worlds there are mental tropes that are not physical tropes.  However, for
reasons that we cannot explore here, there are problems with this, both because of its commitment to
Meinongianism and because of its commitment to the view that properties are classes of actual and possible
things (in this case tropes).  For more on the former, see Lycan (this volume) and the papers in that section.27
further analyzable, are not capable of being analyzed as essentially a trope of one property and
nonessentially a trope of another.  Complex tropes can be so analyzed, but then these have
constituents that cannot between them meet the commitments of nonreductive monism.
Thus, although it may be true that realism suffers from being less uniform than either
nominalism or trope theory in the numbers of kinds of things it admits into its ontology, there
may be an explanatory advantage to be gained from this.  And if so, then Ockham's Razor will
not favour trope theory over realism.23
                                                
23 I would like to thank Graham Bird, Stephen Laurence, Lawrence Lombard, Graham Macdonald, Eric
Rubenstein, and Peter Simons for comments and advice on this .28
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